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Abstract
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents
are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the mar-
ket and the option of remaining unmatched. For the problems that we address, previous au-
thors have presented polynomial-time algorithms for computing a “Pareto-stable” matching.
In the case of college admissions, these algorithms require the preferences of the colleges over
groups of students to satisfy a technical condition related to responsiveness. We design new
polynomial-time Pareto-stable algorithms for stable marriage and college admissions that cor-
respond to strategyproof mechanisms. For stable marriage, it is known that no Pareto-stable
mechanism is strategyproof for all of the agents; our algorithm provides a mechanism that is
strategyproof for the agents on one side of the market. For college admissions, it is known
that no Pareto-stable mechanism can be strategyproof for the colleges; our algorithm provides
a mechanism that is strategyproof for the students.
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78712–1757. Email: {onur, geocklam,plaxton}@cs.utexas.edu. This research was supported by NSF Grant CCF–
1217980. An earlier version of this work appears as a UTCS technical report [3].
1 Introduction
Gale and Shapley [7] introduced the stable marriage model and its generalization to the college
admissions model. Their work spawned a vast literature on two-sided matching; see Manlove [11]
for a recent survey. The present paper is primarily concerned with variants of the stable marriage
and college admissions models where the agents have weak preferences, i.e., where indifferences
are allowed.
In the most basic stable marriage model, we are given an equal number of men and women,
where each man (resp., woman) has complete, strict preferences over the set of women (resp.,
men); we refer to this model as SMCS. For SMCS, an outcome is a matching that pairs up all of
the men and women into disjoint man-woman pairs. A man-woman pair (p, q) is said to form a
blocking pair for a matching M if p prefers q to his partner in M and q prefers p to her partner
in M . A matching is stable if it does not have a blocking pair. It is straightforward to prove that
any stable matching is also Pareto-optimal. Gale and Shapley presented the deferred acceptance
(DA) algorithm for the SMCS problem and proved that the man-proposing version of the DA
algorithm produces the unique man-optimal (and woman-pessimal) stable matching. Roth [12]
showed that the associated mechanism, which we refer to as the man-proposing DA mechanism, is
strategyproof for the men, i.e., it is a weakly dominant strategy for each man to declare his true
preferences. Unfortunately, the man-proposing DAmechanism is not strategyproof for the women.
In fact, Roth [12] showed that no stable mechanism for SMCS is strategyproof for all of the agents.
The SMCWmodel is the generalization of the SMCS model in which each man (resp., woman)
has weak preferences over the set of women (resp., men). When indifferences are allowed, we need
to refine our notion of a blocking pair. A man-woman pair (p, q) is said to form a strongly blocking
pair for a matching M if p prefers q to his partner in M and q prefers p to her partner in M .
A matching is weakly stable if it is individually rational and does not have a strongly blocking
pair. Two other natural notions of stability, namely strong stability and super-stability, have been
investigated in the literature (see Manlove [11, Chapter 3] for a survey of these results). We focus
on weak stability because every SMCW instance admits a weakly stable matching (this follows
from the existence of stable matchings for SMCS, coupled with arbitrary tie-breaking), but not
every SMCW instance admits a strongly stable or super-stable matching. It is straightforward
to exhibit SMCW instances (with as few as two men and two women) for which some weakly
stable matching is not Pareto-optimal. Sotomayor [16] argues that Pareto-stability (i.e., Pareto-
optimality plus weak stability) is an appropriate solution concept for SMCW and certain other
matching models with weak preferences, and proves that every SMCW instance admits a Pareto-
stable matching.
Erdil and Ergin [4] and Chen and Ghosh [2] present polynomial-time algorithms for computing
a Pareto-stable matching of a given SMCW instance; in fact, these algorithms are applicable to
certain more general models to be discussed shortly. Given the existence of a stable mechanism
for SMCS that is strategyproof for the men (or, symmetrically, for the women), it is natural to ask
whether there is a Pareto-stable mechanism for SMCW that is strategyproof for the men. We cannot
hope to find a Pareto-stable mechanism for SMCW that is strategyproof for all agents, since that
would imply a stable mechanism for SMCS that is strategyproof for all agents. A similar statement
holds for the SMIWmodel, the generalization of the SMCWmodel in which the agents are allowed
to express incomplete preferences. See Section 4 for a formal definition of the SMIW model and
the associated notions of weak stability and Pareto-stability. Throughout the remainder of the
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paper, when we say that a mechanism for a stable marriage model is strategyproof, we mean that it
is strategyproof for the agents on one side of the market; moreover, unless otherwise specified, it is
to be understood that the mechanism is strategyproof for the men. The Pareto-stable algorithms of
Erdil and Ergin, and of Chen and Ghosh, are based on a two-phase approach where the first phase
runs the Gale-Shapley DA algorithm after breaking all ties arbitrarily. In Appendix A we show
that this approach does not provide a strategyproof mechanism.
This paper provides the first Pareto-stable mechanism for SMIW (and also SMCW) that is
shown to be strategyproof. We present a nondeterministic algorithm for SMIW that generalizes
Gale and Shapley’s DA algorithm as follows: in each iteration, a nondeterministically chosen
unmatched man “proposes” simultaneously to all of the women in his next-highest tier of pref-
erence (i.e., the highest tier to which he has not already proposed); the women respond to this
proposal by solving a certain maximum-weight matching problem to determine which man be-
comes unmatched (i.e., the man making the proposal or one of the tentatively matched men). Our
generalization of the DA mechanism admits a polynomial-time implementation.
The college admissions model with weak preferences, which we denote CAW, is a further
generalization of the SMIW model. In the CAW model, students and colleges are being matched
rather than men and women, and each college has a positive integer capacity representing the
number of students that it can accommodate. See Section 5 for a formal definition of the CAW
model and the associated notions of weak stability and Pareto-stability.
A key difference between CAW and SMIW is that in addition to expressing preferences over
individual students, the colleges have preferences over groups of students. This characteristic is
shared by the CAS model, which is the restriction of the CAW model to strict preferences. It is
known that no stable mechanism for CAS is strategyproof for the colleges [13]; the proof makes
use of the fact that the colleges do not (in general) have unit demand. It follows that no Pareto-
stable mechanism for CAW is strategyproof for the colleges. Throughout the remainder of the
paper, when we say that a mechanism for a college admissions model is strategyproof, we mean
that it is strategyproof for the students.
Gale and Shapley’s DA algorithm generalizes easily to the CAS model. Roth [13] has shown
that the student-proposing DA algorithm provides a strategyproof stable mechanism for CAS when
the preferences of the colleges are responsive. When the colleges have responsive preferences, the
student-proposing DA mechanism is also known to be student-optimal for CAS [13].
Erdil and Ergin [4] consider the special case of the CAW model where the following restric-
tions hold for all students x and colleges y: x is not indifferent between being assigned to y and
being left unassigned; y is not indifferent between having one of its slots assigned to x and having
that slot left unfilled. We remark that this special case of CAW corresponds to the HRT problem
discussed in Manlove [11, Chapter 3].1 For this special case, Erdil and Ergin present a polynomial-
time algorithm for computing a Pareto-stable matching when the preferences of the colleges satisfy
a technical restriction related to responsiveness. We consider the same class of preferences, which
1In the model of Erdil and Ergin, which is stated using worker-firm terminology rather than student-college ter-
minology, a “no indifference to unemployment/vacancy” assumption makes the aforementioned restrictions explicit.
In the HRT model of Manlove, which is stated using resident-hospital terminology rather than student-college ter-
minology, it is assumed that a set of acceptable resident-hospital pairs is given, and that each agent specifies weak
preferences over the set of agents with whom they form an acceptable pair. We consider the approach of Erdil-Ergin
— where the starting point is the preferences of the individual agents, and the “acceptability” of a given pair of agents
may be deduced from those preferences — to be more natural, but the resulting models are equivalent.
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we refer to as minimally responsive; see Section 5 for a formal definition. The algorithm of Erdil
and Ergin does not provide a strategyproof mechanism. Chen and Ghosh [2] build on the results
of Erdil and Ergin by considering the many-to-many generalization of HRT in which the agents
on both sides of the market have capacities (and the agent preferences are minimally responsive).
For this generalization, Chen and Ghosh provide a strongly polynomial-time algorithm. No strate-
gyproof mechanism (even for the agents on one side of the market) is possible in the many-to-many
setting, since it is a generalization of CAS. We provide the first Pareto-stable mechanism for CAW
that is shown to be strategyproof. As in the work of Erdil-Ergin and Chen-Ghosh, we assume that
the preferences of the colleges are minimally responsive. We can also handle the class of college
preferences “induced by additive utility” that is defined in Section 5.2.
In the many-to-many matching setting addressed by Chen and Ghosh [2], a pair of agents
(on opposite sides of the market) can be matched with arbitrary multiplicity, as long as the ca-
pacity constraints are respected. Chen [1] presents a polynomial-time algorithm for the variation
of many-to-many matching in which a pair of agents can only be matched with multiplicity one.
Kamiyama [8] addresses the same problem using a different algorithmic approach. (The algorithms
of Chen and Kamiyama are strongly polynomial, since we can assume without loss of generality
that the capacity of any agent is at most the number of agents on the other side of the market.) Since
this variation of the many-to-many setting also generalizes CAS, it does not admit a strategyproof
mechanism, even for the agents on one side of the market.
Erdil and Ergin [4, 5] and Kesten [9] consider a second natural solution concept in addition
to Pareto-stability. In the context of SMIW (or its special case SMCW), this second solution
concept seeks a weakly stable matching M that is “man optimal” in the following sense: for all
weakly stable matchings M ′, either all of the men are indifferent between M and M ′, or at least
one man prefers M to M ′. Erdil and Ergin [4] present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute
such a man optimal weakly stable matching for SMIW; in fact, their algorithm is presented for the
generalization of SMIW to CAW. Erdil and Ergin [5] and Kesten [9] prove that no strategyproof
man optimal weakly stable mechanism exists for SMCW. Prior to our work, it was unclear whether
such an impossibility result might hold for strategyproof Pareto-stable mechanisms for SMCW (or
its generalizations to SMIW and CAW).
The assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [15] can be viewed as an auction with multiple
distinct items where each bidder is seeking to acquire at most one item. This class of unit-demand
auctions has been heavily studied in the literature (see, e.g., Roth and Sotomayor [14, Chapter 8]).
In Section 2, we define the notion of a “unit-demand auction with priorities” (UAP) and establish
a number of useful properties of UAPs; these are straightforward generalizations of corresponding
properties of unit-demand auctions. Section 3 builds on the UAP notion to define the notion of an
“iterated UAP” (IUAP), and establishes a number of important properties of IUAPs; these results
are nontrivial to prove and provide the technical foundation for our main results. Section 4 presents
our first main result, a polynomial-time algorithm for SMIW that provides a strategyproof Pareto-
stable mechanism. Section 5 presents our second main result, a polynomial-time algorithm for
CAW that provides a strategyproof Pareto-stable mechanism assuming that the preferences of the
colleges are minimally responsive.
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2 Unit-Demand Auctions with Priorities
In this section, we formally define the notion of a unit-demand auction with priorities (UAP). In
Section 2.1, we describe an associated matroid for a given UAP and we use this matroid to define
the notion of a “greedy MWM”. In Section 2.2, we establish a result related to extending a given
UAP by introducing additional bidders. In Section 2.3, we discuss how to efficiently compute a
greedyMWM in a UAP. In Section 2.4, we introduce a key definition that is helpful for establishing
our strategyproofness results. We start with some useful definitions.
A (unit-demand) bid β for a set of items V is a subset of V × R such that no two pairs in β
share the same first component. (So β may be viewed as a partial function from V to R.)
A bidder u for a set of items V is a triple (α, β, z) where α is an integer ID, β is a bid for V ,
and z is a real priority. For any bidder u = (α, β, z), we define id(u) as α, bid(u) as β, priority(u)
as z, and items(u) as the union, over all (v, x) in β, of {v}.
A unit-demand auction with priorities (UAP) is a pair A = (U, V ) satisfying the following
conditions: V is a set of items; U is a set of bidders for V ; each bidder in U has a distinct ID.
2.1 An Associated Matroid
A UAP A = (U, V ) may be viewed as an edge-weighted bipartite graph, where the set of edges in-
cident on bidder u correspond to bid(u): for each pair (v, x) in bid(u), there is an edge (u, v)
of weight x. We refer to a matching (resp., maximum-weight matching (MWM), maximum-
cardinality MWM (MCMWM)) in the associated edge-weighted bipartite graph as a matching
(resp., MWM, MCMWM) of A. For any edge e = (u, v) in a given UAP, the associated weight is
denoted w(e) or w(u, v). For any set of edges E, we define w(E) as
∑
e∈E w(e). For any UAP A,
we let w(A) denote the weight of an MWM of A.
Lemma 1. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP, and let I denote the set of all subsets U ′ of U such that there
exists an MWM of A that matches every bidder in U ′. Then (U, I) is a matroid.
Proof. The only nontrivial property to show is the exchange property. Assume that U1 and U2
belong to I and that |U1| > |U2|. Let M1 be an MWM of A that matches every bidder in U1,
and let M2 be an MWM of A that matches every bidder in U2. If M2 matches some bidder u in
U1 \ U2, then U2 + u belongs to I, as required. Thus, in what follows, we assume that M2 does
not match any bidder in U1 \ U2. The symmetric difference of M1 and M2, denoted M1 ⊕M2,
corresponds to a collection of vertex-disjoint paths and cycles. Since M2 does not match any
bidder in U1 \ U2, we deduce that each bidder in U1 \ U2 is an endpoint of one of the paths in this
collection. Since |U1| > |U2|, |U1 \ U2| = |U1| − |U1 ∩ U2|, and |U2 \ U1| = |U2| − |U1 ∩ U2|, we
have |U1 \ U2| > |U2 \ U1|. It follows that there is at least one path in this collection, call it P ,
such that one endpoint of P is a bidder u in U1 \ U2 and the other endpoint of P is a vertex y that
does not belong to U2 \ U1. Moreover, y does not belong to U1: if the length of P is odd, then y is
an item and hence does not belong to U1; if the length of P is even, then y is not matched in M1
and hence does not belong to U1. Since y does not belong to U2 \ U1 and does not belong to U1,
we conclude that y does not belong to U2. The edges of P alternate betweenM1 andM2. Let X1
denote the edges of P that belong toM1, and letX2 denote the edges of P that belong toM2. Since
M1 is an MWM of A andM
′
1 = M1 ⊕ P = (M1 ∪ X2) \X1 is a matching of A, we deduce that
w(X1) ≥ w(X2). SinceM2 is an MWM of A andM
′
2 = M2 ⊕P = (M2 ∪X1) \X2 is a matching
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of A, we deduce that w(X2) ≥ w(X1). Hence w(X1) = w(X2) andM
′
1 andM
′
2 are MWMs of A.
The MWM M ′2 matches all of the vertices on P except for y. Since y does not belong to U2, we
conclude thatM ′2 matches all of the vertices in U2 + u, and so the exchange property holds.
For any UAP A, we define matroid(A) as the matroid of Lemma 1.
For any UAP A = (U, V ) and any independent set U ′ of matroid(A), we define the priority
of U ′ as the sum, over all bidders u in U ′, of priority(u). For any UAP A, the matroid greedy
algorithm can be used to compute a maximum-priority maximal independent set of matroid(A).
For any matching M of a UAP A = (U, V ), we define matched(M) as the set of all bidders
in U that are matched in M . We say that an MWM M of a UAP A is greedy if matched(M)
is a maximum-priority maximal independent set of matroid(A). For any UAP A, we define the
predicate unique(A) to hold ifmatched(M) = matched(M ′) for all greedy MWMsM andM ′ of
A.
For any matchingM of a UAP, we define the priority ofM , denoted priority(M), as the sum,
over all bidders u in matched(M), of priority(u). Thus an MWM is greedy if and only if it is a
maximum-priority MCMWM.
Lemma 2. All greedy MWMs of a given UAP have the same distribution of priorities.
Proof. This is a standard matroid result that follows easily from the exchange property and the
correctness of the matroid greedy algorithm.
For any UAP A and any real priority z, we define greedy(A, z) as the (uniquely defined, by
Lemma 2) number of matched bidders with priority z in any greedy MWM of A.
Lemma 3. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP. Let u be a bidder in U such that (v, x) belongs to bid(u),
priority(u) = z, and u is not matched in any greedy MWM of A. Let u′ be a bidder in U such that
(v, x′) belongs to bid(u′), priority(u′) = z′, and u′ is matched to v in some greedy MWM of A.
Then (x, z) < (x′, z′).2
Proof. Let M be a greedy MWM in which u′ is matched to v. Thus u is not matched in M .
Let M ′ denote the matching M − (u′, v) + (u, v). Since M is an MCMWM of A and w(M ′) =
w(M)− x′ + x, we conclude that x ≤ x′. If x < x′, the claim of the lemma follows. Assume that
x = x′. In this case,M ′ is an MCMWM of A since w(M ′) = w(M) and |M ′| = |M |. SinceM is
a greedy MWM ofA and priority(M ′) = priority(M)−z′ +z, we conclude that z ≤ z′. If z = z′
thenM ′ is a greedy MWM of A that matches u, a contradiction. Hence z < z′, as required.
2.2 Extending a UAP
Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP and let u be a bidder such that id(u) is not equal to the ID of any bidder
in U . Then we define A+u as the UAP (U +u, V ). For any UAPs A = (U, V ) and A′ = (U ′, V ′),
we say that A′ extends A if U ⊆ U ′ and V = V ′.
Lemma 4. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP, let u be a bidder in U that is not matched in any greedy
MWM of A, and let A′ = (U ′, V ) be a UAP that extends A. Then u is not matched in any greedy
MWM of A′.
2Throughout this paper, comparisons of pairs are to be performed lexicographically.
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Proof. In what follows, we derive a contradiction by proving that u is matched in a greedy MWM
M1 ofA
′. We need to prove that u is matched in some greedy MWM ofA. LetM0 denote a greedy
MWM of A. If u is matched in M0, we are done, so assume that u is not matched in M0. Thus
M0 ⊕M1 contains a unique path P with u as an endpoint. The edges of P alternate betweenM0
and M1. Let X0 denote the edges of P that belong to M0, and let X1 denote the edges of P that
belong toM1.
Since u is matched in M1 and not in M0, the other endpoint of P is either an item, or it is a
bidder that is matched in M0 and not in M1. Either way, we deduce that all of the vertices on P
belong to A. ThusM ′0 = M0 ⊕P = (M0 ∪X1) \X0 is a matching in A. SinceM0 is an MWM of
A and M ′0 is a matching of A, we deduce that w(M0) ≥ w(M
′
0) and hence that w(X0) ≥ w(X1).
Since all of the vertices on P belong to A′, we conclude that M ′1 = M1 ⊕ P = (M1 ∪ X0) \ X1
is a matching in A′. Since M1 is an MWM of A
′ and M ′1 is a matching of A
′, we deduce that
w(M1) ≥ w(M
′
1) and hence that w(X1) ≥ w(X0). Thus w(X0) = w(X1), and we conclude that
M ′0 is an MWM of A.
Since u is matched inM1 and not inM0, we deduce that |X1| ≥ |X0| and hence that |M
′
0| ≥
|M0|. Since M0 is a greedy MWM of A, we know that M0 is an MCMWM of A, and hence that
|M0| ≥ |M
′
0|. Thus |M0| = |M
′
0| and hence |X0| = |X1| and M
′
0 is an MCMWM of A. Since
|X0| = |X1|, the other endpoint ofP is a bidder u
′ that is matched inM0 and not inM1. SinceM0 is
a greedy MWM of A andM ′0 is an MCMWM of A, we deduce that priority(M0) ≥ priority(M
′
0)
and hence that priority(u′) ≥ priority(u).
Since |X0| = |X1| and w(X0) = w(X1), we deduce thatM
′
1 is an MCMWMofA
′. SinceM1 is
a greedy MWM ofA′ andM ′1 is an MCMWMofA
′, we deduce that priority(M1) ≥ priority(M
′
1)
and hence that priority(u) ≥ priority(u′). Since we argued above that priority(u′) ≥ priority(u),
we conclude that priority(u) = priority(u′), and hence that M ′0 is a greedy MWM of A. This
completes the proof, since u is matched inM ′0.
2.3 Finding a Greedy MWM
In this section, we briefly discuss how to efficiently compute a greedy MWM of a UAP via a slight
modification of the classic Hungarian method for the assignment problem [10]. In the (maximiza-
tion version of the) assignment problem, we are given a set of n agents, a set of n tasks, and a
weight for each agent-task pair, and our objective is to find a perfect matching (i.e., every agent
and task is required to be matched) of maximum total weight. The Hungarian method for the as-
signment problem proceeds as follows: a set of dual variables, namely a “price” for each task, and
a possibly incomplete matching are maintained; an arbitrary unmatched agent u is chosen and a
shortest augmenting path from u to an unmatched task is computed using “residual costs” as the
edge weights; an augmentation is performed along the path to update the matching, and the dual
variables are adjusted in order to maintain complementary slackness; the process repeats until a
perfect matching is found.
Within our UAP setting, the set of bidders can be larger than the set of items, and some bidder-
item pairs may not be matchable, i.e., the associated bipartite graph is not necessarily complete.
In this setting, we can use an “incremental” version of the Hungarian method to find an (not
necessarily greedy) MWM of a given UAP A = (U, V ) as follows. For the purpose of simplifying
the presentation of our method, we enlarge the set of items by adding a dummy item v0 such that
v0 is connected to each bidder u with an edge of weight w(u, v0) = 0 and we always maintain
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v0 in the residual graph with a price of 0. We start with the empty matching M . Then, for each
bidder u in U (in arbitrary order), we process u via an “incremental Hungarian step” as follows:
let U ′ denote the set of bidders that are matched by M ; let V ′ denote the set of items that are not
matched byM ; find the shortest paths from u to each item v in V ′ + v0 in the residual graph; let
W denote the minimum path weight among these shortest paths; choose a path P that is either (1)
a shortest path of weightW from u to an item v in V ′, or (2) a shortest path from u to a bidder u′
in U ′ +u such that extending P with the edge (u′, v0) yields a shortest path of weightW from u to
v0; augment M along P ; adjust the prices in order to maintain complementary slackness; update
the residual graph. The algorithm terminates when every non-reserve bidder has been processed.
The algorithm performs |U | incremental Hungarian steps and each incremental Hungarian step can
be implemented inO(|V | log |V |+ m) time by utilizing Fibonacci heaps [6], wherem denotes the
number of edges in the residual graph, which is O(|V |2).
In order to find a greedy MWM, we slightly modify the implementation described in the previ-
ous paragraph. Lemmas 7 and 8 established below imply that choosing the path P in the following
way results in a greedy MWM: if a path of type (1) exists, we arbitrarily choose such a path; if no
path of type (1) exists, then we identify the nonempty set U ′′ of all bidders u′ such that a path of
type (2) exists, and we choose a shortest path P that terminates at a minimum priority bidder in U ′′.
It is easy to see that the described modification does not increase the asymptotic time complexity
of the algorithm. In the remainder of this section, we establish Lemmas 7, 8, and 9; Lemma 9 is
used in Section 3.2.1 to prove Lemma 19. We start with some useful definitions.
Let A = (U, V ) and A′ = A + u be UAPs, and let M be an MWM of A. We define
digraph(A, u,M) as the edge-weighted digraph that may be obtained by modifying the subgraph
of A induced by the set of vertices (matched(M) + u) ∪ V as follows: for each edge that belongs
toM , we direct the edge from item to bidder and leave the weight unchanged; for each edge that
does not belong toM , we direct the edge from bidder to item and negate the weight.
Lemma 5. Let A = (U, V ) and A′ = A + u be UAPs, letM be an MWM of A, and let G denote
digraph(A, u,M). Then G does not contain any negative-weight cycles.
Proof. Such a cycle could not involve u (since u only has outgoing edges) so it has to be a negative-
weight cycle that already existed before u was added, a contradiction since M is an MWM of
A.
Let A = (U, V ) and A′ = A + u be UAPs, let M be an MWM of A, and let G denote
digraph(A, u,M). We define a set of items holes(A, u,M), and a set of bidders candidates(A, u,
M), as follows. By Lemma 5, the shortest path distance inG from bidder u to any vertex reachable
from u is well-defined. We define holes(A, u,M) as the set of all items v in V such that v is
unmatched in M and the weight of a shortest path in G from u to v is w(A) − w(A′). We define
candidates(A, u,M) as the set of all bidders u′ such that the weight of a shortest path in G from u
to u′ is equal to w(A)− w(A′).
Let A = (U, V ) and A′ = A + u be UAPs, let M be an MWM of A, and let P be a directed
path in digraph(A, u,M) that starts at u, has weight w(A) − w(A′), and terminates at either an
item in holes(A, u,M) or a bidder in candidates(A, u,M). (Note that P could be a path of length
zero from u to u.) Let X denote the edges inM that correspond to item-to-bidder edges in P , and
let Y denote the edges in A′ that correspond to bidder-to-item edges in P . It is easy to see that the
set of edges (M \X)∪Y is an MWM of A′. We define this MWM ofA′ as augment(A, u,M, P ).
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Lemma 6. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP, letM be a greedy MWM of A, let u be a bidder that does
not belong to U , let A′ denote the UAP (U + u, V ), and let M ′ denote a greedy MWM of A′
minimizing |M ⊕M ′|. Then digraph(A, u,M) contains a directed path P satisfying the following
conditions: P has weight w(A) − w(A′); P starts at u; the bidder-to-item edges in P correspond
to the edges in M ′ \ M ; the item-to-bidder edges in P correspond to the edges in M \ M ′; if
holes(A, u,M) is nonempty, then P terminates at an item in holes(A, u,M); if holes(A, u,M) is
empty, then P terminates at a minimum-priority bidder in candidates(A, u,M).
Proof. The edges ofM ⊕M ′ form a collection S of disjoint cycles and paths of positive length.
We begin by arguing that S does not contain any cycles. Suppose there is a cycle C in S. Let
X denote the edges of C that belong to M \M ′, and let Y denote the edges of C that belong to
M ′ \M . LetM ′′ denote (M ∪ Y ) \X , which is a matching in A since u is unmatched inM and
hence does not belong to C. SinceM is an MWM of A and w(M ′′) = w(M) +w(Y )−w(X), we
conclude that w(X) ≥ w(Y ). LetM ′′′ denote (M ′ ∪X) \ Y , which is a matching in A′. SinceM ′
is an MWM of A′ and w(M ′′′) = w(M ′) +w(Y )−w(X), we conclude that w(X) ≤ w(Y ). Thus
w(X) = w(Y ) and hence w(M ′′′) = w(M ′), implying that M ′′′ is an MWM of A′. Moreover,
sinceM ′′′ matches the same set of bidders asM ′, we find thatM ′′′ is a greedy MWM of A′. This
contradicts the definition ofM ′ since |M ⊕M ′′′| < |M ⊕M ′|.
Next we argue that if Q is a path in S, then u is an endpoint of Q. Suppose there is a path Q
in S such that u is not an endpoint of Q. Thus u does not appear on Q since u is unmatched in
M . Let X denote the edges of Q that belong to M \M ′, and let Y denote the edges of Q that
belong to M ′ \ M . Let M ′′ denote (M ∪ Y ) \ X , which is a matching in A since u does not
belong to Q. SinceM is an MWM of A and w(M ′′) = w(M) + w(Y )− w(X), we conclude that
w(X) ≥ w(Y ). LetM ′′′ denote (M ′∪X)\Y , which is a matching inA′. SinceM ′ is an MWM of
A′ and w(M ′′′) = w(M ′) +w(Y )−w(X), we conclude that w(X) ≤ w(Y ). Thus w(X) = w(Y )
and hence w(M ′′) = w(M) and w(M ′′′) = w(M ′), implying thatM ′′ is an MWM of A and M ′′′
is an MWM of A′. Since M is a greedy MWM and hence an MCMWM of A, the set of bidders
matched by M is not properly contained in the set of bidders matched by M ′′; we conclude that
|X| ≥ |Y |. SinceM ′ is a greedy MWM and hence an MCMWM of A′, the set of bidders matched
byM ′ is not properly contained in the set of bidders matched byM ′′′; we conclude that |X| ≤ |Y |.
Thus |X| = |Y |, so the length of path Q is even. We consider two cases.
Case 1: The endpoints of Q are items. In this case,M ′ andM ′′′ match the same set of bidders,
and henceM ′′′ is a greedy MWM of A′. This contradicts the definition ofM ′, sinceQ has positive
length and hence |M ⊕M ′′′| < |M ⊕M ′|.
Case 2: The endpoints of Q are bidders. Since Q has positive length, one endpoint, call it u0,
is matched in M but not in M ′, and the other endpoint, call it u1, is matched in M
′ but not in
M . Since M is a greedy MWM of A and M ′′ is an MWM of A, we deduce that priority(u0) ≥
priority(u1). Since M
′ is a greedy MWM of A′ and M ′′′ is an MWM of A′, we deduce that
priority(u0) ≤ priority(u1). Thus priority(u0) = priority(u1). It follows that priority(M
′′′) =
priority(M ′). Hence M ′′′ is a greedy MWM of A′. This contradicts the definition of M ′ since
|M ⊕M ′′′| < |M ⊕M ′|.
From the preceding arguments, we deduce that either M = M ′ or M ⊕M ′ corresponds to a
positive-length path with u as an endpoint. Equivalently,M ⊕M ′ is the edge set of a path that has
u as an endpoint and may have length zero (i.e., the path may begin and end at u). We claim if the
edges of this path are directed away from endpoint u, we obtain a directed path P satisfying the six
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conditions stated in the lemma. It is easy to see that P satisfies the first four of these conditions. It
remains to establish that P satisfies the fifth and sixth conditions.
For the fifth condition, assume that holes(A, u,M) is nonempty. We need to prove that P
terminates at an item in holes(A, u,M). Since holes(A, u,M) is nonempty, we deduce that |M ′| =
|M |+1, and hence that P terminates at some item v. Since P has weight w(A)−w(A′), we deduce
that v belongs to holes(A, u,M), as required.
For the sixth condition, assume that holes(A, u,M) is empty. We need to prove that P termi-
nates at a minimum-priority bidder in candidates(A, u,M). Suppose P terminates at some item
v. Since P has weight w(A) − w(A′), we deduce that v belongs to holes(A, u,M), a contradic-
tion. Thus P terminates at some bidder u′. Since P has weight w(A) − w(A′), we deduce that u′
belongs to candidates(A, u,M). If u′ is not a minimum-priority bidder in candidates(A, u,M),
it is easy to argue that M ′ is not a greedy MWM of A′, a contradiction. Thus P terminates at a
minimum-priority bidder in candidates(A, u,M).
Lemma 7. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP, letM be a greedy MWM of A, let u be a bidder that does
not belong to U , let A′ denote the UAP (U +u, V ), let P be a directed path in digraph(A, u,M) of
weightw(A)−w(A′) from u to an item in holes(A, u,M), and letM∗ denote augment(A, u,M, P ).
ThenM∗ is a greedy MWM of A′.
Proof. The definition of augment(A, u,M, P ) implies thatM∗ is an MWM of A′. LetM ′ denote
a greedy MWM of A′ minimizing |M ⊕M ′|. Let U ′ denote the set of bidders in Amatched byM .
Since holes(A, u,M) is nonempty, Lemma 6 implies that the set of bidders in A′ matched byM ′
is U ′ + u. SinceM∗ is an MWM of A′ that also matches the set of bidders U ′ + u, we deduce that
M∗ is a greedy MWM of A′.
Lemma 8. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP, letM be a greedy MWM of A, let u be a bidder that does
not belong to U , and let A′ denote the UAP (U + u, V ). Assume that holes(A, u,M) is empty. Let
u′ denote a minimum-priority bidder in candidates(A, u,M) (which is nonempty by Lemma 6),
let P be a directed path in digraph(A, u,M) of weight w(A) − w(A′) from u to u′, and let M∗
denote augment(A, u,M, P ). ThenM∗ is a greedy MWM of A′.
Proof. The definition of augment(A, u,M, P ) implies thatM∗ is an MWM of A′. LetM ′ denote
a greedy MWM of A′ minimizing |M ⊕M ′|. Let U ′ denote the set of bidders in A matched by
M . Since holes(A, u,M) is empty, Lemma 6 implies that the set of bidders in A′ matched by
M ′ is U ′ + u − u′′, where u′′ is some minimum-priority bidder in candidates(A, u,M). It is
straightforward to check thatM∗ has the same weight, cardinality, and priority asM ′. ThusM∗ is
a greedy MWM of A′, as required.
Lemma 9. Let A and A′ be two UAPs such that A′ extends A, letM be a greedy MWM of A, and
letM ′ be a greedy MWM of A′. Then |M ′| ≥ |M |.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 7 and 8.
2.4 Threshold of an Item
In this section, we define the notion of a “threshold” of an item in a UAP. This lays the groundwork
for a corresponding IUAP definition in Section 3.2. Item thresholds play an important role in our
strategyproofness results.
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Lemma 10. Let A = (U, V ) be a UAP and let v be an item in V . Let U ′ be the set of bidders u
such that A + u is a UAP and bid(u) is of the form {(v, x)}. Then there is a unique pair of reals
(x∗, z∗) such that for any bidder u in U ′, the following conditions hold, where A′ denotes A + u,
x denotes w(u, v), and z denotes priority(u): (1) if (x, z) > (x∗, z∗) then u is matched in every
greedy MWM of A′; (2) if (x, z) < (x∗, z∗) then u is not matched in any greedy MWM of A′; (3)
if (x, z) = (x∗, z∗) then u is matched in some but not all greedy MWMs of A′.
Proof. Let M be a greedy MWM of A, let W denote w(M), and let Z denote priority(M). Let
M denote the set of matchings of A′ that do not match v, let M′ denote the maximum-weight
elements of M, let M′′ denote the maximum-cardinality elements of M′, let M′′′ denote the
maximum-priority elements ofM′′, and observe that there is a unique pair of reals (W ′, Z ′) such
that any matchingM ′ inM′′′ has weightW ′ and priority Z ′. It is straightforward to verify that the
unique choice of (x∗, z∗) satisfying the conditions stated in the lemma is (W −W ′, Z − Z ′).
For any UAP A = (U, V ) and any item v in V , we define the unique pair (x∗, z∗) of Lemma 10
as threshold(A, v).
3 Iterated Unit-Demand Auctions with Priorities
In this section, we formally define the notion of an iterated unit-demand auction with priorities
(IUAP). An IUAP allows the bidders, called “multibidders” in this context, to have a sequence of
unit-demand bids instead of a single unit-demand bid. In Section 3.1, we define a mapping from
an IUAP to a UAP by describing an algorithm that generalizes the DA algorithm, and we estab-
lish Lemma 15 that is useful for analyzing the matching produced by Algorithm 2 of Section 4.
Lemma 15 is used to establish weak stability (Lemmas 27, 28, and 29) and Pareto-optimality
(Lemma 30). In Section 3.2, we define the threshold of an item in an IUAP and we establish
Lemma 18, which plays a key role in establishing our strategyproofness results. We start with
some useful definitions.
A multibidder t for a set of items V is a pair (σ, z) where z is a real priority and σ is a sequence
of bidders for V such that all the bidders in σ have distinct IDs and a common priority z. We define
priority(t) as z. For any integer i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ |σ|, we define bidder(t, i) as the bidder σ(i).
For any integer i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ |σ|, we define bidders(t, i) as {bidder(t, j) | 1 ≤ j ≤ i}. We
define bidders(t) as bidders(t, |σ|).
An iterated UAP (IUAP) is a pair B = (T, V ) where V is a set of items and T is a set of
multibidders for V . In addition, for any distinct multibidders t and t′ in T , the following conditions
hold: priority(t) 6= priority(t′); if u belongs to bidders(t) and u′ belongs to bidders(t′), then
id(u) 6= id(u′). For any IUAP B = (T, V ), we define bidders(B) as the union, over all t in T , of
bidders(t).
3.1 Mapping an IUAP to a UAP
Having defined the notion of an IUAP, we now describe an algorithm TOUAP that maps a given
IUAP to a UAP. Algorithm TOUAP generalizes the DA algorithm. In each iteration of the DA
algorithm, a single man is nondeterministically chosen, and this man reveals his next choice. In
each iteration of TOUAP, a single multibidder is nondeterministically chosen, and this multibidder
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reveals its next bid. We prove in Lemma 14 that, like the DA algorithm, algorithm TOUAP is
confluent: the output does not depend on the nondeterministic choices made during an execution.
We conclude this section by establishing Lemma 15, which is useful for analyzing the matching
produced by Algorithm 2 in Section 4. Lemma 15 is used to establish weak stability (Lemmas 27,
28, and 29) and Pareto-optimality (Lemma 30). We start with some useful definitions.
Let A be a UAP (U, V ) and let B be an IUAP (T, V ). The predicate prefix(A,B) is said to
hold if U ⊆ bidders(B) and for any multibidder t in T , U ∩ bidders(t) = bidders(t, i) for some i.
A configuration C is a pair (A,B) where A is a UAP, B is an IUAP, and prefix(A,B) holds.
Let C = (A,B) be a configuration, where A = (U, V ) and B = (T, V ), and let u be a bidder
in U . Then we define multibidder(C, u) as the unique multibidder t in T such that u belongs to
bidders(t).
Let C = (A,B) be a configuration where A = (U, V ) and B = (T, V ). For any t in T , we
define bidders(C, t) as {u ∈ U | multibidder(C, u) = t}.
Let C = (A,B) be a configuration where B = (T, V ). We define ready(C) as the set of all
bidders u in bidders(B) such that greedy(A, priority(u)) = 0 and u = bidder(t, |bidders(C, t)|+
1) where t = multibidder(C, u).
Algorithm 1 TOUAP(B)
Input: An IUAP B = (T, V )
1: A← (∅, V )
2: C ← (A,B)
3: while ready(C) is nonempty do
4: A← A+ an arbitrary bidder in ready(C)
5: C ← (A,B)
6: end while
7: return A
Our algorithm for mapping an IUAP to a UAP is Algorithm 1. The input is an IUAP B and
the output is a UAP A such that prefix(A,B) holds. The algorithm starts with the UAP consisting
of all the items in V but no bidders. At this point, no bidder of any multibidder is “revealed”.
Then, the algorithm iteratively and nondeterministically chooses a “ready” bidder and “reveals” it
by adding it to the UAP that is maintained in the program variable A. A bidder u associated with
some multibidder t = (σ, z) is ready if u is not revealed and for each bidder u′ that precedes u in σ,
u′ is revealed and is not matched in any greedy MWM of A. It is easy to verify that the predicate
prefix(A,B) is an invariant of the algorithm loop: if a bidder u belonging to a multibidder t is to
be revealed at an iteration, and U ∩ bidders(t) = bidders(t, i) for some integer i at the beginning
of this iteration, then U ∩bidders(t) = bidders(t, i+1) after revealing u, where (U, V ) is the UAP
that is maintained by the program variable A at the beginning of the iteration. No bidder can be
revealed more than once since a bidder cannot be ready after it has been revealed; it follows that
the algorithm terminates. We now argue that the output of the algorithm is uniquely determined
(Lemma 14), even though the bidder that is revealed in each iteration is chosen nondeterministi-
cally.
For any configuration C = (A,B), we define the predicate tail(C) to hold if for any bidder
u that is matched in some greedy MWM of A, we have u = bidder(t, |bidders(C, t)|) where t
denotes multibidder(C, u).
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Lemma 11. Let C = (A,B) be a configuration where B = (T, V ) and assume that tail(C) holds.
Then greedy(A, priority(t)) ≤ 1 for each t in T .
Proof. The claim of the lemma easily follows from the definition of tail(C).
Lemma 12. The predicate tail(C) is an invariant of the Algorithm 1 loop.
Proof. It is easy to see that tail(C) holds when the loop is first encountered. Now consider an iter-
ation of the loop that takes us from configuration C = (A,B) where A = (U, V ) to configuration
C ′ = (A′, B) where A′ = (U ′, V ). We need to show that tail(C ′) holds. Let u be a bidder that is
matched in some greedy MWM M ′ of A′. Let u∗ denote the bidder that is added to A in line 4,
and consider the following three cases.
Case 1: u = u∗. Let t denote multibidder(C ′, u∗). In this case, |bidders(C, t)| + 1 =
|bidders(C ′, t)|, so u∗ = bidder(t, |bidders(C ′, t)|), as required.
Case 2: u 6= u∗ and priority(u) 6= priority(u∗). Since U ′ contains U , Lemma 4 implies that u
is matched in some greedy MWM of A. Since C is a configuration and tail(C) holds, we deduce
that u = bidder(t, |bidders(C, t)|)where t denotesmultibidder(C, u). Sincemultibidder(C ′, u) =
multibidder(C, u) and bidders(C ′, t) = bidders(C, t), we conclude that u is equal to bidder(t,
|bidders(C ′, t)|) where t denotes multibidder(C ′, u), as required.
Case 3: u 6= u∗ and priority(u) = priority(u∗). Since u∗ belongs to ready(C), we know that
greedy(A, priority(u)) = 0. Also, since u is not u∗, u belongs to U and we conclude that u is not
matched in any greedy MWM of A. Since U ′ contains U , Lemma 4 implies that u is not matched
in any greedy MWM of A′, a contradiction.
Lemma 13. Let C = (A,B) be a configuration such that tail(C) holds. Then unique(A) holds.
Proof. LetM andM ′ be greedy MWMs of A, and let u be a bidder in matched(M). To establish
the lemma, it is sufficient to prove that u belongs tomatched(M ′). Let t denotemultibidder(C, u)
and let z denote priority(t). Since tail(C) holds, we know that u = bidder(t, |bidders(C, t)|).
Since u is matched byM and since tail(C) holds, Lemma 11 implies that greedy(A, z) = 1. Thus
Lemma 2 implies thatM ′ matches one priority-z bidder. Since tail(C) holds, this bidder is u.
Lemma 14. Let B = (T, V ) be an IUAP. Then all executions of Algorithm 1 on input B produce
the same output.
Proof. Suppose not, and letX1 andX2 denote two executions of Algorithm 1 on input B that pro-
duce distinct output UAPsA1 = (U1, V ) andA2 = (U2, V ). Without loss of generality, assume that
|U1| ≥ |U2|. Then there is a first iteration of executionX1 in which the bidder added to A in line 4
belongs to U1 \U2; let u
′ denote this bidder. Let C ′ = (A′, B) where A′ = (U ′, V ) denote the con-
figuration in program variable C at the start of this iteration, and let t′ denotemultibidder(C ′, u′).
Let i be the integer such that u′ = bidder(t′, i). We know that i > 1 because it is easy to see that
U2 contains bidder(t
′, 1). Let u′′ denote bidder(t′, i − 1). Since u′ belongs to ready(C ′), Lem-
mas 12 and 13 imply that u′′ is not matched in any greedy MWM of A′. Since U ′ is contained in
U2, Lemma 4 implies that u
′′ is not matched in any greedy MWM of A2. Let C2 = (A2, B) denote
the final configuration of execution X2; thus ready(C2) is empty and |bidders(C2, t
′)| = i − 1.
By Lemma 12, we conclude that greedy(A2, priority(t
′)) = 0, and hence that u′′ is contained in
ready(C2), a contradiction.
For any IUAP B, we define uap(B) as the unique (by Lemma 14) UAP returned by any execu-
tion of Algorithm 1 on input B.
We can use the modified incremental Hungarian step of Section 2.3 in each iteration of the
loop of Algorithm 1 to maintain UAP A, and a greedy MWM of A, as follows: we maintain
dual variables (a price for each item) and a residual graph; the initial greedy MWM is the empty
matching; when a bidder u is added to A at line 4, we perform an incremental Hungarian step
to process u to update the greedy MWM, the prices, and the residual graph. Since we maintain
a greedy MWM of A at each iteration of the loop, it is easy to see that identifying a bidder in
ready(C) (or determining that this set is empty) takes O(|V |) time. Thus the whole algorithm can
be implemented in O(|bidders(B)| · |V |2) time.
We now present a lemma that is used in Section 4 to establish weak stability (Lemmas 27, 28,
and 29) and Pareto-optimality (Lemma 30).
Lemma 15. Let B = (T, V ) be an IUAP, let (σ, z) be a multibidder that belongs to T , let uap(B)
be (U, V ), and letM be a greedy MWM of the UAP (U, V ). Then the following claims hold: (1)
if σ(k) is matched in M for some k, then σ(k′) ∈ U if and only if 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k; (2) if σ(k) is not
matched inM for any k, then σ(k) ∈ U for 1 ≤ k ≤ |σ|.
Proof. Since prefix(A,B) and tail(C) hold at the end of Algorithm 1 by Lemma 12, the first claim
follows. Since ready(C) is empty at the end of Algorithm 1, the second claim follows.
3.2 Threshold of an Item
In this section, we define the threshold of an item in an IUAP and we establish Lemma 18, which
plays a key role in establishing our strategyproofness results. We start with some useful definitions.
For any IUAP B, Lemmas 12 and 13 imply that unique(uap(B)) holds, and thus that every
greedy MWM of uap(B) matches the same set of bidders. We define this set of matched bidders as
winners(B). For any IUAP B, we define losers(B) as U \ winners(B) where (U, V ) is uap(B).
Let B = (T, V ) be an IUAP and let u = (α, β, z) be a bidder for V . Then we define the IUAP
B + u as follows: if T contains a multibidder t of the form (σ, z) for some sequence of bidders
σ, then we define B + u as (T − t + t′, V ) where t′ = (σ′, z) and σ′ is the sequence of bidders
obtained by appending u to σ; otherwise, we define B + u as (T + t, V ) where t = (〈u〉, z).
Lemma 16. Let B = (T, V ) and B′ = B + u be IUAPs. Then losers(B) ⊆ losers(B′).
Proof. Let u′ be a bidder in losers(B). Thus u′ is not matched in any greedy MWM of uap(B).
Using Lemma 14, it is easy to see that uap(B′) extends uap(B). Thus Lemma 4 implies that u′ is
not matched in any greedy MWM of uap(B′), and hence that u′ belongs to losers(B′).
Lemma 17. Let B = (T, V ) be an IUAP and let v be an item in V . For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Bi = B+ui
be an IUAPwhere ui = (αi, {(v, xi)} , zi). LetA1 = (U1, V ) denote uap(B1) and letA2 = (U2, V )
denote uap(B2). Assume that α1 6= α2, z1 6= z2, and u1 belongs to winners(B1). Then the
following claims hold: if u2 belongs to winners(B2) then U1 − u1 = U2 − u2; if u2 belongs to
losers(B2) then U1 − u1 contains U2 − u2.
Proof. Let B3 denote the IUAP B1 + u2, which is equal to B2 + u1. For the first claim, assume
that u2 belongs to winners(B2). Using Lemma 14, it is straightforward to argue that uap(B3) is
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equal to A1 + u2 = (U1 + u2, V ) and is also equal to A2 + u1 = (U2 + u1, V ). Since u1 belongs
to U1 and u2 belongs to U2, we conclude that U1 − u1 = U2 − u2, as required.
For the second claim, assume that u2 belongs to losers(B2). Suppose (x1, z1) < (x2, z2). Then
Lemmas 3 and 14 imply that u2 belongs to winners(B3). Since u2 belongs to losers(B2), Lemma
16 implies that u2 belongs to losers(B2 + u1) = losers(B3), a contradiction. Since z1 6= z2, we
conclude that (x1, z1) > (x2, z2). Then, Lemma 14 implies that uap(B3) = uap(B1) + u2 =
(U1 + u2, V ). Since Lemma 14 also implies that uap(B3) extends uap(B2), it follows that U1 +u2
contains U2, and hence that U1 contains U2−u2. Since u1 does not belong to U2, we conclude that
U1 − u1 contains U2 − u2, as required.
We are now ready to define the threshold of an item in an IUAP, and to state Lemma 18.
In Section 4, Lemma 18 plays an important role in establishing that our SMIW mechanism is
strategyproof (Lemma 32). The proof of Lemma 18 is provided in Section 3.2.1.
Let B = (T, V ) be an IUAP and let v be an item in V . By Lemma 17, there is a unique subset
U of bidders(B) such that the following condition holds: for any IUAP B′ = B + u where u is of
the form (α, {(v, x)} , z) and u belongs to winners(B′), uap(B′) is equal to (U +u, V ). We define
uap(B, v) as the UAP (U, V ), and we define threshold(B, v) as threshold(uap(B, v), v).
Lemma 18. Let B = (T, V ) be an IUAP, let t = (σ, z) be a multibidder that belongs to T , and
let B′ denote the IUAP (T − t, V ). Suppose that (σ(k), v) is matched in some greedy MWM of
uap(B) for some k. Then
(w(σ(k), v), z) ≥ threshold(B′, v). (1)
Furthermore, for each k′ and v′ such that 1 ≤ k′ < k and v′ belongs to items(σ(k′)), we have
(w(σ(k′), v′), z) < threshold(B′, v′). (2)
3.2.1 Proof of Lemma 18
The purpose of this section is to prove Lemma 18. We do so by establishing a stronger result,
namely Lemma 26 below. We start with a useful definition.
For any IUAP B, we define priorities(B) as {z | u ∈ winners(B) and priority(u) = z}.
Lemma 19. Let B = (T, V ) and B′ = B + u = (T ′, V ) be IUAPs, let Z denote priorities(B), let
Z ′ denote priorities(B′), and let z denote priority(u). Then |Z ′| ≥ |Z| and Z ′ ⊆ Z + z.
Proof. Consider running Algorithm 1 on inputB′, where we avoid selecting bidder u from ready(C)
unless it is the only bidder in ready(C). (By Lemma 14, the final output is the same regardless
of which bidder is selected from ready(C) at each iteration.) If u never enters ready(C), then
uap(B′) = uap(B), and so Z ′ = Z, and the claim of the lemma holds.
Now suppose that u enters ready(C) at some point. LetA = (U, V ) denote the UAP at the start
of the iteration in which u is selected from ready(C). Then A is equal to uap(B), and we deduce
that uap(B′) extends uap(B). Lemma 11 implies that every greedy MWM of A = uap(B) (resp.,
uap(B′)) matches exactly one bidder of each priority in Z (resp., Z ′). Then, since uap(B′) extends
uap(B), Lemma 9 implies that |Z ′| ≥ |Z|. Furthermore, letting U ′ denote the set of all bidders
u′ in bidders(B) such that priority(u′) does not belong to Z + z, we deduce that U ′ is contained
in losers(B) = U \ winners(B). Then Lemma 16 implies that no bidder in U ′ is matched in any
greedy MWM of uap(B′), and thus Z ′ ⊆ Z + z.
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Lemma 20. Let A = (U, V ) and A′ = A + u be UAPs, and let v be an item in V . Then
threshold(A, v) ≤ threshold(A′, v).
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that threshold(A, v) > threshold(A′, v). Then there
exists a bidder u′ such that u′ does not belong to U + u, bid(u′) = {(v, x)} , priority(u′) = z, and
threshold(A′, v) < (x, z) < threshold(A, v).
Since (x, z) < threshold(A, v), Lemma 10 implies that u′ is not matched in any greedy MWM of
A + u′. Thus Lemma 4 implies that u′ is not matched in any greedy MWM of A′ + u′. On the
other hand, since threshold(A′, v) < (x, z), Lemma 10 implies that u′ is matched in every greedy
MWM of A′ + u′, a contradiction.
Lemma 21. Let B = (T, V ) and B′ = B + u be IUAPs where u = (α, {(v, x)} , z), v is an
item in V , and z does not belong to priorities(B). If u belongs to winners(B′), then (x, z) >
threshold(B, v). If u belongs to losers(B′), then (x, z) < threshold(B, v).
Proof. First, assume that u belongs to winners(B′). Thus u is matched in every greedy MWM
of uap(B′), which is equal to uap(B, v) + u by definition. Lemma 10 implies that (x, z) >
threshold(uap(B, v), v) = threshold(B, v), as required.
Now assume that u belongs to losers(B′). Thus u is not matched in any greedy MWM of
uap(B′). Define U so that uap(B′) = (U + u, V ), and let A denote the UAP (U, V ). Lemma 10
implies that (x, z) < threshold(A, v). Lemma 17 implies that uap(B, v) +u extends uap(B′), and
hence that uap(B, v) extends A. Lemma 20 therefore implies that
threshold(A, v) ≤ threshold(uap(B, v), v) = threshold(B, v).
Thus (x, z) < threshold(B, v), as required.
Lemma 22. Let B = (T, V ) and B′ = B + u be IUAPs, and let v be an item in V . Then
threshold(B, v) ≤ threshold(B′, v).
Proof. Let (x, z) denote threshold(B, v), let (x′, z′) denote threshold(B′, v), and assume for the
sake of contradiction that (x, z) > (x′, z′).
Let u′ be a bidder (α, {(v, x)} , z′′) such that z′′ does not belong to priorities(B)+priority(u),
z > z′′, and (x, z′′) > (x′, z′). Let B′′ denote B + u′ and let B′′′ denote B′ + u′. Since z′′ does not
belong to priorities(B), we deduce that u′ belongs to either winners(B′′) or losers(B′′). Then,
by Lemma 21, u′ belongs to losers(B′′), and hence by Lemma 16, u′ belongs to losers(B′′′). On
the other hand, since z′′ does not belong to priorities(B) + priority(u), Lemma 19 implies that
z′′ does not belong to priorities(B′), and we deduce that u′ belongs to either winners(B′′′) or
losers(B′′′). Then, Lemma 21 implies that u′ belongs to winners(B′′′), a contradiction.
Lemma 23. Let B = (T, V ) and B′ = B + u be IUAPs where u belongs to losers(B′), and let v
be an item in V . Then threshold(B′, v) = threshold(B, v).
Proof. Suppose not. Then by Lemma 22, we have threshold(B, v) < threshold(B′, v). Let z
denote priority(u). Since B′ = B + u and u belongs to losers(B′), we deduce that z does not
belong to priorities(B). Since u belongs to losers(B′), we deduce that z does not belong to
priorities(B′). Hence Lemma 19 implies that priorities(B′) = priorities(B).
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Let B′′ denote B + u′ where u′ = (α, {(v, x′)} , z′) is a bidder such that z′ does not belong to
priorities(B) + z and threshold(B, v) < (x′, z′) < threshold(B′, v).
Let B′′′ denote B′ + u′. Since z′ does not belong to priorities(B) + z, Lemma 19 implies
that z′ does not belong to priorities(B′), and we deduce that u′ belongs to either winners(B′′′) or
losers(B′′′). Since (x′, z′) < threshold(B′, v), Lemma 21 implies that u′ belongs to losers(B′′′).
Hence Lemma 19 implies that priorities(B′′′) = priorities(B′). Since we have established above
that priorities(B′) = priorities(B), we deduce that priorities(B′′′) = priorities(B).
Since z′ does not belong to priorities(B), we deduce that u′ belongs to either winners(B′′) or
losers(B′′). Since (x′, z′) > threshold(B, v), Lemma 21 implies that u′ belongs to winners(B′′)
and hence z′ belongs to priorities(B′′). We consider two cases.
Case 1: |priorities(B′′)| ≤ |priorities(B)|. Lemma 19 implies that there exists a real z′′ in
priorities(B) that does not belong to priorities(B′′). Since z does not belong to priorities(B),
we have z 6= z′′. Since B′′′ = B′′ + u and z 6= z′′, Lemma 19 implies that z′′ does not belong to
priorities(B′′′), a contradiction since priorities(B′′′) = priorities(B).
Case 2: |priorities(B′′)| > |priorities(B)|. Since priorities(B′′′) = priorities(B), we de-
duce that |priorities(B′′)| > |priorities(B′′′)|. Since B′′′ = B′′ + u, Lemma 19 implies that
|priorities(B′′′)| ≥ |priorities(B′′)|, a contradiction.
Lemma 24. Let B = (T, V ) and B′ = B + u be IUAPs where u = (α, β, z) and z does not
belong to priorities(B), and let v be an item in V . Assume that (v, x) belongs to β, and that
threshold(B, v) < (x, z). Then u belongs to winners(B′).
Proof. Suppose not. Let A′ = (U ′, V ) denote uap(B′). Since z does not belong to priorities(B),
we deduce that u belongs to U ′. Thus u belongs to U ′ \ winners(B′) = losers(B′), and so
threshold(B′, v) = threshold(B, v) by Lemma 23.
Let B′′ denote B′ + u′ where u′ = (α, {(v, x)} , z′) is a bidder such that z′ does not be-
long to priorities(B) + z, threshold(B, v) < (x, z′), and z′ < z. Since z′ does not belong to
priorities(B) + z, we deduce that u′ belongs to either winners(B′′) or losers(B′′). Then, by
Lemma 21, u′ belongs to winners(B′′). Let A′′ = (U ′′, V ) denote uap(B′′), and letM be a greedy
MWM of A′′. Since u′ belongs to winners(B′′), the edge (u′, v) belongs toM . Since u belongs to
losers(B′), Lemma 16 implies that u belongs to losers(B′′), and hence that u is unmatched inM .
By Lemma 3, we find that (x, z) < (x, z′) and hence z < z′, a contradiction.
Lemma 25. Let B = (T, V ) and B0 = B + u be IUAPs where u = (α, β, z), z does not belong to
priorities(B), and β = {(v1, x1), . . . , (vk, xk)}. Assume that (xi, z) < threshold(B, vi) holds for
all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then u belongs to losers(B0).
Proof. Suppose not. Since z does not belong to priorities(B), we deduce that u belongs to
winners(B0), and hence that z belongs to priorities(B0).
For i ranging from 1 to k, let Bi denote the IUAP Bi−1 + ui where ui = (αi, {(vi, xi)} , zi)
and zi is a real number satisfying the following conditions: zi does not belong to priorities(Bi−1);
z < zi; (xi, zi) < threshold(B, vi). Since zi does not belong to priorities(Bi−1), we deduce that
ui belongs to either winners(Bi) or losers(Bi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then, by Lemmas 21 and 22, we
deduce that ui belongs to losers(Bi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By repeated application of Lemma 19, we find
that priorities(Bi) = priorities(B0) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and hence that z belongs to priorities(Bk).
We claim that u belongs to winners(Bk). To prove this claim, let t denote the unique multi-
bidder in Bk for which priority(t) = priority(u). Let ℓ denote |bidders(t)|, and observe that u =
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bidder(t, ℓ). Furthermore, since z does not belong to priorities(B), we deduce that bidder(t, i)
belongs to losers(B) for 1 ≤ i < ℓ. By repeated application of Lemma 16, we deduce that
bidder(t, i) belongs to losers(Bk) for 1 ≤ i < ℓ. Since z belongs to priorities(Bk), the claim
follows.
LetM denote a greedy MWM of uap(Bk). Since u belongs to winners(Bk), there is a unique
integer i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such thatM contains edge (u, vi). Let i denote this integer. Since zi does not
belong to priorities(Bk), we know that ui belongs to losers(Bk) and hence that ui is not matched
in any greedy MWM of uap(Bk). By Lemma 3, we deduce that (xi, zi) < (xi, z). Hence zi < z,
contradicting the definition of zi.
Lemma 26. Let B0 = (T, V ) be an IUAP, let z be a real that is not equal to the priority of any
multibidder in T , let k be a nonnegative integer, and for i ranging from 1 to k, let Bi denote the
IUAP Bi−1 + ui, where priority(ui) = z. Let I denote the set of all integers i in {1, . . . , k} such
that there exists an item v in V for which (w(ui, v), z) > threshold(B0, v). If I is empty, then z
does not belong to priorities(Bk). Otherwise, uj belongs to winners(Bk), where j denotes the
minimum integer in I .
Proof. If I is empty, then by repeated application of Lemmas 23 and 25, we find that ui belongs
to losers(Bi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By repeated application of Lemma 16, we deduce that ui belongs to
losers(Bk) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It follows that z does not belong to priorities(Bk), as required.
Now assume that I is nonempty, and let j denote the minimum integer in I . Arguing as in the
preceding paragraph, we find that z does not belong to priorities(Bj−1). By repeated application
of Lemma 23, we deduce that threshold(Bj−1, v) = threshold(B0, v) for all items v in V . Thus
Lemma 24 implies that uj belongs to winners(Bj). Then, since uj+1, . . . , uk all have the same
priority as uj, it is easy to argue by Lemma 14 that uap(Bk) = uap(Bj), and hence uj belongs to
winners(Bk), as required.
Proof of Lemma 18. It is easy to see that the claims of the lemma follow from Lemma 26.
4 Stable Marriage with Indifferences
The stable marriage model with incomplete and weak preferences (SMIW) involves a set P of men
and a set Q of women. The preference relation of each man p in P is specified as a binary relation
p over Q ∪ {∅} that satisfies transitivity and totality, where ∅ denotes being unmatched. Simi-
larly, the preference relation of each woman q inQ is specified as a binary relationq over P∪{∅}
that satisfies transitivity and totality, where ∅ denotes being unmatched. To allow indifferences,
the preference relations are not required to satisfy antisymmetry. We will use ≻p and ≻q to denote
the asymmetric part of p and q respectively.
A matching is a function µ from P to Q ∪ {∅} such that for any woman q in Q, there exists at
most one man p in P for which µ(p) = q. Given a matching µ and a woman q in Q, we denote
µ(q) =


p if µ(p) = q
∅ if there is no man p in P such that µ(p) = q
A matching µ is individually rational if for any man p in P and woman q in Q such that
µ(p) = q, we have q p ∅ and p q ∅. A pair (p, q
′) in P ×Q is said to form a strongly blocking
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pair for a matching µ if q′ ≻p µ(p) and p ≻q′ µ(q
′). A matching isweakly stable if it is individually
rational and does not admit a strongly blocking pair.
For any matching µ and µ′, we say that the binary relation µ  µ′ holds if for every man p in
P and woman q in Q, we have µ(p) p µ
′(p) and µ(q) q µ
′(q). We let ≻ denote the asymmetric
part of . We say that a matching µ Pareto-dominates another matching µ′ if µ ≻ µ′. We say that
a matching is Pareto-optimal if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other matching. A matching is
Pareto-stable if it is Pareto-optimal and weakly stable.
A mechanism is an algorithm that, given (P,Q, (p)p∈P , (q)q∈Q), produces a matching µ. A
mechanism is said to be strategyproof (for the men) if for any man p in P expressing preference
′p instead of his true preference p, we have µ(p) p µ
′(p), where µ and µ′ are the matchings
produced by the mechanism given p and 
′
p, respectively, when all other inputs are fixed.
By introducing extra men or women who prefer being unmatched to being matched with any
potential partner, we may assume without loss of generality that the number of men is equal to the
number of women. So, P = {p1, . . . , pn} and Q = {q1, . . . , qn}.
4.1 Algorithm
The computation of a matching for SMIW is shown in Algorithm 2. We construct an item for each
woman in line 4, and a multibidder for each man in line 13 by examining the tiers of preferences
of the men and the utilities of the women. Together with dummy items constructed in line 8, this
forms an IUAP, from which we obtain a UAP and a greedy MWMM0. Using Lemma 15, we argue
that for any man pi, exactly one of the bidders associated with pi is matched inM0; see the proof
of Lemma 27. Finally, in line 18, we useM0 to determine the match of a man pi as follows, where
u denotes the unique bidder associated with pi that is matched inM0: if u is matched inM0 to the
item corresponding to a woman qj, then we match pi to qj; otherwise, u is matched to a dummy
item inM0, and we leave pi unmatched.
In Lemma 28, we prove individually rationality by arguing that the dummy items ensure that
no man or woman is matched to an unacceptable partner. In Lemma 29, we prove weak stability
using the properties of a greedy MWM. In Lemmas 30 and 31, we prove Pareto-optimality by
showing that any matching that Pareto-dominates the output matching induces another MWM that
contradicts the greediness of the MWM produced by the algorithm. In Lemma 32, we establish
two properties of IUAP thresholds that are used to show strategyproofness in Theorem 1.
Lemma 27. Algorithm 2 produces a valid matching.
Proof. First, we show that for any man pi where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists at most one j in
{1, . . . , 2n} such that bidder σi(k) is matched to item vj in M0 for some k. For the sake of
contradiction, suppose bidder σi(k) is matched to item vj and bidder σi(k
′) is matched to item vj′
in M0 for some k and k
′ where j 6= j′. By Lemma 15, we have k ≤ k′ and k′ ≤ k. Therefore,
bidder σi(k) = σi(k
′) is matched inM0 to both vj and vj′ , which is a contradiction.
Next, we show that for any man pi where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists at least one j in {1, . . . , 2n}
such that bidder σi(k) is matched to item vj in M0 for some k. For the sake of contradiction,
suppose bidder σi(k) is unmatched inM0 for all k. Let j denote n + i and let k denote κi(qj). By
Lemma 15, the set U contains bidder σi(k). Since both bidder σi(k) and item vj are unmatched by
M0, adding the pair (σi(k), vj) toM0 gives a matching of (U, V ) with the same weight and larger
cardinality. This contradicts the fact thatM0 is a greedy MWM of (U, V ).
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Algorithm 2
1: Let p0 denote ∅.
2: for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n do
3: Convert the preference relation qj of woman qj into utility function ψqj : P ∪ {∅} → R
that satisfies the followings: ψqj (∅) = 0; for any i and i
′ in {0, 1, . . . , n}, we have pi qj pi′
if and only if ψqj (pi) ≥ ψqj (pi′). This utility assignment should not depend on the preferences
of the men.
4: Construct an item vj corresponding to woman qj .
5: end for
6: for all n < j ≤ 2n do
7: Let qj denote ∅.
8: Construct a dummy item vj corresponding to qj.
9: end for
10: for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
11: Partition the set {1, . . . , n}∪{n+i} of woman indices into tiers τi(1), . . . , τi(Ki) according
to the preference relation of man pi, such that for any j in τi(k) and j
′ in τi(k
′), we have
qj pi qj′ if and only if k ≤ k
′.
12: For j in {1, . . . , n} ∪ {n + i}, denote tier number κi(qj) as the unique k such that j in
τi(k).
13: Construct a multibidder ti = (σi, zi) with priority zi = i corresponding to man pi. The
multibidder ti has Ki bidders. For each bidder σi(k) we define items(σi(k)) as {vj | j ∈
τi(k)} and w(σi(k), qj) as ψqj (pi), where ψqn+i(pi) is defined to be 0.
14: end for
15: (T, V ) = ({ti | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, {vj | 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n}).
16: (U, V ) = uap(T, V ).
17: Compute a greedy MWMM0 of UAP (U, V ) as described in Section 2.3.
18: Output matching µ such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n, we have µ(pi) = qj if and
only if σi(k) is matched to item vj inM0 for some k.
This shows that µ(pi) is well-defined for all men pi where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Furthermore, since each
item vj where 1 ≤ j ≤ n is matched to at most one bidder inM0, each woman qj is matched to at
most one man pi in µ where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence, µ is a valid matching.
Lemma 28. Algorithm 2 produces an individually rational matching.
Proof. We have shown in Lemma 27 that µ is a valid matching. Consider man pi and woman qj
such that µ(pi) = qj , where i and j belong to {1, . . . , n}. Let k denote κi(qj) and let k
′ denote
κi(qn+i). It suffices to show that k ≤ k
′ and ψqj (pi) ≥ 0.
Since µ(pi) = qj , bidder σi(k) is matched to item vj in M0. Since M0 is an MWM, we have
ψqj (pi) = w(σi(k), vj) ≥ 0.
It remains to show that k ≤ k′. For the sake of contradiction, suppose k > k′. Since bidder
σi(k) is matched to item vj in M0, by Lemma 15 the set U contains bidder σi(k
′). Since bidder
σi(k
′) is not matched in M0, the dummy item vn+i is also not matched in M0. Hence, adding the
pair (σi(k
′), vn+i) to M0 gives a matching in (U, V ) with the same weight and larger cardinality.
This contradicts the fact thatM0 is a greedy MWM of (U, V ).
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Lemma 29. Algorithm 2 produces a weakly stable matching.
Proof. By Lemma 28, it remains only to show that µ does not admit a strongly blocking pair.
Consider man pi and woman qj′ , where i and j
′ belong to {1, . . . , n}. We want to show that
(pi, qj′) does not form a strongly blocking pair. Let qj denote µ(pi) and let pi′ denote µ(qj′), where
j belongs to {1, . . . , n} ∪ {n + i} and i′ belongs to {0, 1, . . . , n}. It suffices to show that either
κi(qj) ≤ κi(qj′) or ψqj′ (pi′) ≥ ψqj′ (pi). For the sake of contradiction, suppose κi(qj) > κi(qj′) and
ψqj′ (pi′) < ψqj′ (pi). Let k denote κi(qj) and let k
′ denote κi(qj′). Since σi(k) is matched in M0
and k′ < k, Lemma 15 implies that the set U contains bidder σi(k
′) and that σi(k
′) is unmatched
inM0. We consider two cases.
Case 1: i′ = 0. Then ψqj′ (pi) > ψqj′ (pi′) = 0. Since neither bidder σi(k
′) nor item vj′ is
matched inM0, adding the pair (σi(k
′), vj′) toM0 gives a matching of (U, V ) with a larger weight.
This contradicts the fact thatM0 is an MWM of (U, V ).
Case 2: i′ 6= 0. Since pi′ = µ(qj′), there exists k
′′ such that bidder σi′(k
′′) is matched to vj′ in
M0. Since σi(k
′) is unmatched inM0, the matchingM0−(σi′(k
′′), vj′)+(σi(k
′), vj′) is a matching
of (U, V ) with weight w(M0)−ψqj′ (pi′) +ψqj′ (pi), which is greater than w(M0). This contradicts
the fact thatM0 is an MWM of (U, V ).
Lemma 30. Let µ be the matching produced by Algorithm 2 and let µ′ be a matching such that
µ′(p) p µ(p) for every man p in P and
∑
q∈Q
ψq(µ
′(q)) ≥
∑
q∈Q
ψq(µ(q)).
Then µ(p) p µ
′(p) for every man p in P and
∑
q∈Q
ψq(µ
′(q)) =
∑
q∈Q
ψq(µ(q)).
Proof. For any i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let ki denote κi(µ(pi)) and let k
′
i denote κi(µ
′(pi)).
Below we use µ′ to construct an MWMM ′0 of (U, V ). We give the construction ofM
′
0 first, and
then argue thatM ′0 is an MWM of (U, V ). LetM
′
0 denote the set of bidder-item pairs (σi(k
′
i), vj)
such that µ′(pi) = qj where i in {1, . . . , n} and j in {1, . . . , n} ∪ {n+ i}. It is easy to see thatM
′
0
is a valid matching. Notice that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, since µ′(pi) pi µ(pi), we have k
′
i ≤ ki. So, by
Lemma 15, the set U contains all bidders σi(k
′
i). Hence,M
′
0 is a matching of (U, V ). Furthermore,
it is easy to see that
w(M ′0) =
∑
1≤j≤n
ψqj (µ
′(qj)) ≥
∑
1≤j≤n
ψqj (µ(qj)) = w(M0).
ThusM ′0 is an MWM of (U, V ), and we have
∑
1≤j≤n
ψqj (µ
′(qj)) =
∑
1≤j≤n
ψqj (µ(qj)).
Furthermore, M ′0 is an MCMWM of (U, V ) because both M
′
0 and M0 have cardinality equal to
n. Also, M ′0 is a greedy MWM of (U, V ), because both M
′
0 and M0 have priorities equal to∑
1≤i≤n zi. Hence, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have ki ≤ k
′
i by Lemma 15. Thus, µ(pi) pi µ
′(pi) for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Lemma 31. Let µ be the matching produced by Algorithm 2 and µ′ be a matching such that µ′  µ.
Then, µ  µ′.
Proof. Since µ′  µ, we have µ′(pi) pi µ(pi) and ψqj (µ
′(qj)) ≥ ψqj (µ(qj)) for every i and j in
{1, . . . , n}. So, by Lemma 30, we have µ(pi) pi µ
′(pi) for every i in {1, . . . , n} and
∑
1≤j≤n
ψqj (µ
′(qj)) =
∑
1≤j≤n
ψqj (µ(qj)).
Therefore, ψqj (µ
′(qj)) = ψqj (µ(qj)) for every j in {1, . . . , n}. This shows that µ  µ
′.
Lemma 32. Consider Algorithm 2. Suppose µ(pi) = qj , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and j belongs to
{1, . . . , n} ∪ {n + i}. Then, we have
(ψqj (pi), i) ≥ threshold((T − ti, V ), vj). (3)
Furthermore, for all j′ in {1, . . . , n} ∪ {n + i} such that κi(qj′) < κi(qj), we have
(ψqj′ (pi), i) < threshold((T − ti, V ), vj′). (4)
Proof. Let k denote κi(qj). Since µ(pi) = qj , we know that bidder σi(k) is matched to item vj in
M0. So, inequality (1) of Lemma 18 implies inequality (3), because w(σi(k), vj) = ψqj (pi) and
zi = i.
Now, suppose κi(qj′) < κi(qj). Let k
′ denote κi(qj′). Since k
′ < k, inequality (2) of Lemma 18
implies inequality (4), because w(σi(k
′), vj′) = ψqj′ (pi) and zi = i.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 2 is a strategyproof Pareto-stable mechanism for the stable marriage prob-
lem with incomplete and weak preferences (for any fixed choice of utility assignment).
Proof. We have shown in Lemma 29 that the algorithm produces a weakly stable matching. More-
over, Lemma 31 shows that the weakly stable matching produced is not Pareto-dominated by any
other matching. Hence, the algorithm produces a Pareto-stable matching. It remains to show that
the algorithm is a strategyproof mechanism.
Suppose man pi expresses 
′
pi
instead of his true preference relation pi , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let µ and µ′ be the resulting matchings given pi and 
′
pi
, respectively. Let qj denote µ(pi) and
let qj′ denote µ
′(pi), where j and j
′ belong to {1, . . . , n} ∪ {n + i}. Let k denote κi(qj) and let
k′ denote κi(qj′), where κi(·) denotes the tier number with respect to pi . It suffices to show that
k ≤ k′. For the sake of contradiction, suppose k > k′.
Let (T, V ) be the IUAP, let ti be the multibidder corresponding to man pi, and let vj′ be the
item corresponding to woman qj′ constructed in the algorithm given input pi . Since µ(pi) = qj ,
by inequality (4) of Lemma 32, we have
(ψqj′ (pi), i) < threshold((T − ti, V ), vj′).
Now, consider the behavior of the algorithm when preference relationpi is replaced with
′
pi
.
Let (T ′, V ′) be the IUAP, let t′i be the multibidder corresponding to man pi, and let v
′
j′ be the item
corresponding to woman qj′ constructed in the algorithm given input 
′
pi
. Since µ′(pi) = qj′ , by
inequality (3) of Lemma 32, we have
(ψqj′ (pi), i) ≥ threshold((T
′ − t′i, V
′), v′j′).
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Notice that in Algorithm 2, the only part of the IUAP instance that depends on the preferences
of man pi is the multibidder corresponding to man pi. In particular, we have T − ti = T
′ − t′i,
V = V ′, and vj′ = v
′
j′ . Hence, we get
(ψqj′ (pi), i) < threshold((T − ti, V ), vj′)
= threshold((T ′ − t′i, V
′), v′j′)
≤ (ψqj′ (pi), i),
which is a contradiction.
5 College Admissions with Indifferences
The college admissions model with weak preferences (CAW) involves a set P of students and a
set Q of colleges. The preference relation of each student p in P is specified as a binary relation
p over Q ∪ {∅} that satisfies transitivity and totality, where ∅ denotes being unmatched. The
preference relation of each college q in Q over individual students is specified as a binary relation
q over P ∪ {∅} that satisfies transitivity and totality, where ∅ denotes being unmatched. Each
college q in Q has an associated integer capacity cq > 0. We will use ≻p and ≻q to denote the
asymmetric parts of p and q , respectively.
The colleges’ preference relation over individual students can be extended to group preference
using responsiveness. We say that a transitive and reflexive relation ′q over the power set 2
P is
responsive to the preference relation q if the following conditions hold: for any S ⊆ P and p in
P \ S, we have p q ∅ if and only if S ∪ {p} 
′
q S; for any S ⊆ P and any p and p
′ in P \ S,
we have p q p
′ if and only if S ∪ {p} ′q S ∪ {p
′}. Furthermore, we say that a relation ′q is
minimally responsive to the preference relation q if it is responsive to the preference relation q
and does not strictly contain another relation that is responsive to the preference relation q.
A (capacitated) matching is a function µ from P to Q ∪ {∅} such that for any college q in Q,
there exists at most cq students p in P for which µ(p) = q. Given a matching µ and a college q in
Q, we let µ(q) denote {p ∈ P | µ(p) = q}.
A matching µ is individually rational if for any student p in P and college q in Q such that
µ(p) = q, we have q p ∅ and p q ∅. A pair (p
′, q) in P ×Q is said to form a strongly blocking
pair for a matching µ if q ≻p′ µ(p
′) and at least one of the following two conditions holds: (1)
there exists a student p in P such that µ(p) = q and p′ ≻q p; (2) |µ(q)| < cq and p
′ ≻q ∅. A
matching is weakly stable if it is individually rational and does not admit a strongly blocking pair.
Let ′q be the group preference associated with college q in Q. For any matching µ and µ
′,
we say that the binary relation µ  µ′ holds if for every student p in P and college q in Q, we
have µ(p) p µ
′(p) and µ(q) ′q µ
′(q). We let ≻ denote the asymmetric part of . We say that
a matching µ Pareto-dominates another matching µ′ if µ ≻ µ′. We say that a matching is Pareto-
optimal if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other matching. A matching is Pareto-stable if it is
Pareto-optimal and weakly stable.
A mechanism is an algorithm that, given (P,Q, (p)p∈P , (q)q∈Q, (cq)q∈Q), produces a match-
ing µ. A mechanism is said to be strategyproof (for the students) if for any student p in P expressing
preference ′p instead of their true preference p, we have µ(p) p µ
′(p), where µ and µ′ are the
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matchings produced by the mechanism given p and 
′
p, respectively, when all other inputs are
fixed.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the number of students equals the total capacity
of the colleges. So, P = {pi}1≤i≤|P | and Q = {qj}1≤j≤|Q| such that |P | =
∑
1≤j≤|Q| cqj .
5.1 Algorithm
The computation of a matching for CAW is shown in Algorithm 3. We transform each student to
a man in line 1, and each slot of a college to a woman in line 2. This forms an SMIW. Using this
SMIW, we produce a matching by invoking Algorithm 2 in lines 8 and 9.
Algorithm 3
1: For each 1 ≤ i ≤ |P |, construct man p′i corresponding to student pi.
2: For each 1 ≤ j ≤ |Q|, construct women q′j1, . . . , q
′
jc corresponding to college qj with capacity
c = cqj .
3: (P ′, Q′) = ({p′i | 1 ≤ i ≤ |P |}, {q
′
jk | 1 ≤ j ≤ |Q| and 1 ≤ k ≤ cqj}).
4: Let p0 denote ∅. Let p
′
0 denote ∅.
5: Let q0 denote ∅. Let q
′
00 denote ∅.
6: For each 1 ≤ i ≤ |P |, define the preference relation p′
i
over Q′ ∪ {q′00} for man p
′
i using the
preference relation of his corresponding student, such that q′jk p′i q
′
j′k′ if and only if qj pi qj′ .
7: For each 1 ≤ j ≤ |Q| and 1 ≤ k ≤ cqj , define the preference relation q′jk over P
′ ∪ {p′0} for
woman q′jk using the preference relation of her corresponding college, such that p
′
i q′jk p
′
i′ if
and only if pi qj pi′ .
8: Compute matching µ0 for SMIW (P
′, Q′, (p′)p′∈P ′, (q′)q′∈Q′) using Algorithm 2, where we
require the utility functions associated with the same college to be the same.
9: Output matching µ, such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |P | and 0 ≤ j ≤ |Q|, we have µ(pi) = qj if and
only if µ0(p
′
i) = q
′
jk for some k.
Lemma 33. Algorithm 3 produces an individually rational matching.
Proof. It is easy to see that µ satisfies the capacity constraints because each college qj is associated
with cqj women q
′
jk and each woman can be matched with at most one man in µ0 by Lemma 27.
The individual rationality of µ follows from the individual rationality of µ0. Let pi in P and qj
in Q such that µ(pi) = qj . Then µ0(p
′
i) = q
′
jk for some k. By Lemma 28, we have q
′
jk p′i ∅ and
p′i q′jk ∅. Hence, qj pi ∅ and pi qj ∅.
Lemma 34. Algorithm 3 produces a weakly stable matching.
Proof. By Lemma 33, it remains only to show that µ does not admit a strongly blocking pair.
Consider student pi′ in P and college qj in Q. In what follows, we use the weak stability of µ0 to
show that (pi′ , qj) does not form a strongly blocking pair.
Let q′j′k′ denote µ0(p
′
i′). It is possible that q
′
j′k′ = ∅, in which case j
′ = k′ = 0. For 1 ≤ k ≤
cqj , let p
′
ik
denote µ0(q
′
jk), where p
′
ik
belongs to P ′ ∪ {p′0}. By Lemma 29, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ cqj ,
either q′j′k′ p′
i′
q′jk or p
′
ik
q′
jk
p′i′ , for otherwise (p
′
i′, q
′
jk) forms a strongly blocking pair.
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Suppose q′j′k′ p′
i′
q′jk for some 1 ≤ k ≤ cqj . Then qj′ pi′ qj , and hence (pi′ , qj) does not
form a strongly blocking pair.
Otherwise, p′ik q′jk p
′
i′ for all 1 ≤ k ≤ cqj . Then pik qj pi′ for all 1 ≤ k ≤ cqj . In particular,
we have pik qj pi′ for all students pik in P such that µ(pik) = qj . Furthermore, if |µ(qj)| < cqj ,
then pik = ∅ for some 1 ≤ k ≤ cqj . Hence ∅ qj pi′ . It follows that (pi′, qj) does not form a
strongly blocking pair.
Lemma 35. Suppose that for every college q in Q, the group preference relation ′q is minimally
responsive to q. Let µ be the matching produced by Algorithm 3 and let µ
′ be a matching such
that µ′  µ. Then µ  µ′.
Proof. Since µ′ is a matching that satisfies the capacity constraints, we can construct an SMIW
matching µ′0 : P
′ → Q′∪{q′00} such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |P | and 0 ≤ j ≤ |Q|, we have µ
′(pi) = qj
if and only if µ0(p
′
i) = q
′
jk for some k.
Since µ′  µ, we have µ′(pi) pi µ(pi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |P | and µ
′(qj) 
′
qj
µ(qj) for every
1 ≤ j ≤ |Q|. Thus µ′0(p
′
i) p′i µ0(p
′
i) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |P | and
∑
1≤k≤cqj
ψq′
jk
(µ′0(q
′
jk)) ≥
∑
1≤k≤cqj
ψq′
jk
(µ0(q
′
jk))
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ |Q|. Hence, by Lemma 30, we have µ0(p
′
i) p′i µ
′
0(p
′
i) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |P |
and ∑
1≤j≤|Q|
∑
1≤k≤cqj
ψq′
jk
(µ′0(q
′
jk)) =
∑
1≤j≤|Q|
∑
1≤k≤cqj
ψq′
jk
(µ0(q
′
jk)).
Therefore, we have µ(pi) pi µ
′(pi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |P | and
∑
1≤k≤cqj
ψq′
jk
(µ′0(q
′
jk)) =
∑
1≤k≤cqj
ψq′
jk
(µ0(q
′
jk))
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ |Q|. We conclude that µ(qj) 
′
qj
µ′(qj) for every 1 ≤ j ≤ |Q|. Thus
µ  µ′.
Theorem 2. Suppose that for every college q in Q, the group preference relation ′q is minimally
responsive to q . Algorithm 3 is a strategyproof Pareto-stable mechanism for the college admis-
sions problem with weak preferences (for any fixed choice of utility assignment).
Proof. We have shown in Lemma 34 that Algorithm 3 produces a weakly stable matching. More-
over, Lemma 35 shows that the weakly stable matching produced is not Pareto-dominated by any
other matching. Hence, Algorithm 3 produces a Pareto-stable matching.
To show that Algorithm 3 provides a strategyproof mechanism, suppose student pi expresses
′pi instead of their true preference relationpi , where 1 ≤ i ≤ |P |. Let µ and µ
′ be the matchings
produced by Algorithm 3 given pi and 
′
pi
, respectively. Let µ0 and µ
′
0 be the SMIW matching
produced by the call to Algorithm 2 (line 8 of Algorithm 3) givenpi and 
′
pi
, respectively.
Notice that in Algorithm 3, the only part of the stable marriage instance that depends on the
preferences of student pi is the preference relation corresponding to man p
′
i. Since Algorithm 2
is strategyproof by Theorem 1, we have µ0(p
′
i) p′i µ
′
0(p
′
i) where p′i is the preference relation of
man p′i in the algorithm givenpi . Hence, µ(pi) pi µ
′(pi).
24
We remark that our algorithm admits an O(n4)-time implementation, where n is the sum of the
number of students and the total capacities of all the colleges, because the reduction from CAW
to IUAP takes O(n2) time, and lines 16 and 17 of Algorithm 2 can be implemented in O(n4) time
using the version of the incremental Hungarian method discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3.1.
5.2 Further Discussion
In our SMIW and CAW algorithms, we transform the preference relations of the women and col-
leges into real-valued utility functions. One way to do this is to take
ψq(p) = |{p
′ ∈ P ∪ {∅} : p q p
′}| − |{p′ ∈ P ∪ {∅} : ∅ q p
′}|.
This is by no means the only way. In fact, different ways of assigning the utilities can affect the
outcome. Nonetheless, our mechanisms remain strategyproof for the men as long as the utility
assignment is fixed and independent of the preferences of the men, as shown in Theorems 1 and 2.
We can also consider the scenario where each college expresses their preferences directly in
terms of a utility function instead of a preference relation. Such utility functions provide another
way to extend preferences over individuals to group preferences. If a college q expresses the utility
function ψq over individual students in P ∪ {∅}, we can define the group preference induced by
additive utility ψq as a binary relation 
′
q over 2
P such that S ′q S
′ if and only if
∑
p∈S
ψq(p) ≥
∑
p∈S′
ψq(p).
Our algorithm can accept such utility functions as input in lieu of constructing them by some
utility assignment method. It is not hard to see that the mechanism remains Pareto-stable and
strategyproof when the group preferences of the colleges are induced by additive utilities.
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A Discussion of the Two-Phase Approach
As discussed in Section 1, Erdil and Ergin [4] present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing
a Pareto-stable matching for a given instance of SMCW (and also its generalizations to SMIW and
CAW). Their algorithm uses a two-phase approach: in the first phase, ties are broken arbitrarily,
and the Gale-Shapley DA algorithm is used to obtain a weakly stable matching; in the second
phase, the matching is repeatedly updated via a sequence of Pareto improvements until no such
improvement is possible. This two-phase framework was previously proposed by Sotomayor [16],
who argued its correctness by observing that when we apply a Pareto improvement to a weakly
stable matching, we obtain another weakly stable matching.
It is natural to ask whether there is a strategyproof Pareto-stable mechanism for SMCW based
on the foregoing two-phase approach. More precisely, suppose the men and women are indexed
from 1 to n, and assume that we break ties in the first phase in favor of higher-indexed agents. Is
there a way to implement the second phase so that the resulting two-phase algorithm corresponds
to a strategyproof Pareto-stable mechanism? The example presented below provides a negative
answer to this question.
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Consider an SMCW instance I with men {p1, p2, p3} and women {q1, q2, q3}, and where the
preferences of the agents are as follows: p1 prefers q2, then q3, then q1; p2 prefers q1, then q3, then
q2; p3 is indifferent between q1 and q2, and prefers q1 and q2 to q3; q1 prefers p3, then p1, then p2;
q2 is indifferent between all of the men; q3 prefers p3, then p2, then p1. LetM1 throughM6 denote
the six possible matchings: M1 = {(p1, q1), (p2, q2), (p3, q3)}; M2 = {(p1, q1), (p2, q3), (p3, q2)};
M3 = {(p1, q2), (p2, q1), (p3, q3)}; M4 = {(p1, q2), (p2, q3), (p3, q1)}; M5 = {(p1, q3), (p2, q1),
(p3, q2)}; M6 = {(p1, q3), (p2, q2), (p3, q1)}. It is easy to verify that {M2,M4,M5} is the set of
weakly stable matchings for I . (Matchings M1 and M3 are blocked by (p3, q1), and matching
M6 is blocked by (p2, q3).) Furthermore, the set of Pareto-stable matchings for I is {M4,M5}.
(MatchingM2 is Pareto-dominated by matchingM4.) If we break ties in favor of the agents with
higher indices, then it is easy to verify that the first phase produces matching M5. Since M5 is
Pareto-stable, the second phase does not update the matching, and henceM5 is the final output.
Now suppose man p1 lies by stating that he prefers q2, then q1, then q3, and let I
′ denote the re-
sulting SMCW instance. It is easy to verify that {M2,M4} is the set of weakly stable matchings for
I ′. (MatchingsM1 andM3 are blocked by (p3, q1), matchingM5 is blocked by (p1, q1), and match-
ing M6 is blocked by (p2, q3).) Furthermore, the set of Pareto-stable matchings for I
′ is {M4}.
(MatchingM2 is Pareto-dominated by matchingM4.) ThusM4 is the only possible output of the
second phase. Since man p1 prefers his match underM4 to his match underM5, strategyproofness
is violated.
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